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This paper analyses the implications of information dissemination on
currency crises in models with self-ful￿lling expectations. Following Mor-
ris/Shin (1999, 2000), we introduce noisy private and public information, so
that under certain conditions for the noise parameters a unique equilibrium
is derived. Comparative statics then show that if the fundamental state
of the economy is good, the probability of a currency crisis decreases in
the precision of public information, but increases in the precision of private
information. In case of bad fundamentals, however, more precise public in-
formation increases the likelihood of a crisis, whereas more precise private
information leads to a lower crisis probability.
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Following the currency crises of the last decade in Europe, Mexico and Asia, a
growing literature has appeared trying to explain and formalize ￿nancial turmoil.
First-generation models of currency crises (Krugman 1979) emphasize the role of
deteriorating fundamentals for speculative attacks on the ￿xed currency peg, e.g.
due to inconsistent governmental debt policies. Second-generation models (Ob-
stfeld 1996), however, show that crises can occur even in the context of policies
that are consistent with the ￿xed peg. In these models, crises follow a coordina-
tion problem due to mutually reinforcing actions on the part of the speculators.
Since it is more attractive to attack the ￿xed exchange rate if others do so as
well, whereas there is an incentive to refrain from attacking if one expects the
other market participants to do the same, beliefs turn out to be self-ful￿lling and
multiple equilibria result. A major drawback of these models is the ambiguity of
possible outcomes, as the sole prediction to be made is that there exists a range of
fundamentals for which a crisis is possible but does not have to occur necessarily.
Moreover, the multiple equilibria approach does not explain the shift in beliefs,
which incites the economy to move from one equilibrium to the next. Conse-
quently, there is no way of generating comparative statics and policy devices can
hardly be derived.
The procedure of eliminating a number of equilibria in a currency-market
setting was ￿rstly taken up by Morris and Shin (1998). Drawing on a concept
by Carlsson/vanDamme (1993), they show that the introduction of noisy private
information into a simple currency crisis model with multiple equilibria leads to a
unique equilibrium as long as the amount of noise is relatively small. Adding noise
removes multiplicity since agents’ beliefs and actions can no longer be perfectly
coordinated. In later models, they allow for private as well as public information
and show that under certain conditions for the precision of private and public
signals uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed (Morris/Shin 1999, 2000).
In this paper we make use of the Morris/Shin method and analyse a second-
generation currency crisis model with private and public information. Based on
the existing results for the uniqueness of equilibrium, we are able to derive com-
parative statics. Our aim is to analyse the in￿uence of di￿erent model parameters,
especially of varying precision of private and public information, on the proba-
bility of a currency crisis. Moreover, we want to ￿nd out whether and in which
way the in￿uence of varying precision depends on the fundamental state of the
economy.
In our model, public information is disseminated by the central bank through
1publishing economic data and statistics. However, the publicly available informa-
tion can be quite noisy. This might be due to the fact that economic concepts,
which are the basis of statistical measurements, are faulty, or due to preliminarily
published statistics with some underlying data still missing. We presume that
the central bank can control for the precision of public information, for instance
by prohibiting the publishing of preliminary and incomplete data or in general
by controlling for the amount of data that is to be published. Nevertheless, the
central bank can only determine the precision of its signal1 ex-ante, whereas from
then on this parameter stays constant. This assumption is plausible since a central
bank’s communication policy involves institutions that cannot be altered easily
and quickly. The commonly observed public signal is then used by economic
agents to make inferences over the fundamental state of the economy, which is
unknown to them. Additionally to the public signal, each market participant re-
ceives an individual private signal, which is observed only by him. Although the
precision is the same for all private signals, they might and will di￿er from each
other.
As Morris and Shin (1999) show, uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed if the
precision of private information is large relative to the precision of public infor-
mation. Taking this condition as met, we are able to analyse comparative statics,
giving particular attention to the in￿uence of private and public information on
the probability of a currency attack. In the setting of our model, we ￿nd that
in case of a bad fundamental state of the economy, the probability of a currency
crisis is higher the more precise the public information and the less precise the pri-
vate information is. In contrast, in a situation with good fundamentals, a higher
precision of the public signal and a lower precision of the private signal lead to a
lower likelihood of a crisis.
Our main ￿nding thus complements the results of several other research pa-
pers. These are mainly concerned with only one form of information at a time,
either private or public. Whereas Heinemann/Illing (1999) analyse a model with
only private information and infer that increasing the precision of this information
always decreases the danger of a crisis, Sbracia/Zaghini (2001) compare models
with public information on the one hand and with private information on the
other. They conclude that "providing public information seems to be more con-
venient when fundamentals are ’rather bad’ than when fundamentals are ’rather
good’." In using a model with both public and private information we see that this
result has to be corrected for the interaction between the two types of information.
1The terms information and signal are used interchangeably.
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the
basic form of the currency crisis model to be used. Section three sketches the
unique equilibrium result by Morris and Shin. We brie￿y review how the lack
of common knowledge of speculators’ beliefs and actions eliminates dominated
strategies and give the condition for the unique equilibrium strategy. The main
part of the paper in section four concentrates on comparative statics of the unique
equilibrium, which will be derived analytically and explained thoroughly. Section
￿ve analyzes the importance of private and public information for equilibrium
selection. Section six concludes.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a small open economy where the central bank has pegged the ex-
change rate at a certain parity. There is a continuum of risk-neutral speculators
in the foreign exchange market, indexed by the unit interval [0;1]. Each spec-
ulator disposes of one unit of the currency and can decide whether to short-sell
this unit, i.e. attack the currency peg, or not to do so. If the attack is successful
he gets a ￿xed payo￿ D, D > 0. Taking a speculative position in the market,
however, also leads to costs of t, t > 0, which comprise both transaction costs and
the interest rate di￿erential between the considered countries. We assume that
costs t are small relative to the available payo￿ D, i.e. t < D, so that there is a
potential incentive to attack the currency peg in the ￿rst place. If a speculator
refrains from selling the currency he is not exposed to any costs, but he does not
gain anything either.
Since we abstract from welfare considerations, we simply assume that the
central bank is willing to defend the peg as long as the international reserves
that it is endowed with, are above a predetermined critical level. This critical
level depends on the central bank’s assessment of the fundamental state of the
economy. If the fundamentals are good, the critical level is low, so that the central
bank will be willing to use a large amount of international reserves to defend the
exchange rate. However, if the fundamentals are bad, the central bank will only
want to lose few reserves before giving in to the attack and devalue the peg. In
our model, an index of the fundamental state of the economy is given by µ, with
a high value of µ referring to good fundamentals and a low value of µ representing
bad fundamentals. Let the proportion of attacking speculators be denoted by l. If
µ is su￿ciently high, the central bank is able to always defend the peg, irrespective
of the number of attacking speculators. Nevertheless, if µ is su￿ciently low, the
3central bank abandons the peg in favour of a devaluation even if none of the
speculators sell the currency. More precisely,
² if l < µ, the central bank keeps the peg: an attack is unsuccessful
² if l ¸ µ, the central bank devalues the peg: an attack leads to success
The game between speculators and central bank is then structured as follows:
Nature chooses the value of the fundamental index µ according to a uniform
distribution over the real line.2 This can be interpreted as the limiting case where
speculators have very di￿use (almost no) prior information about the distribution
of µ, so that they take each possible value as equally likely.3 Nature’s choice
of µ can be observed by the central bank, but not by the speculators. After
having observed µ, the central bank disseminates a public signal y = µ + º, with
º » N(0; 1
®), ® > 0 and E(ºµ) = 0, so that the noise parameter is independent
of the truly chosen fundamental state. This signal is public in the sense that it
is common knowledge to all market participants.4 The precision ® of the public
signal is exogenous to the model, i.e. ® is chosen before the central bank gets to
know the true value of µ and stays constant throughout the course of the game.
The distribution of the noise parameter º is common knowledge as well.
Additionally to the public signal, each speculator i individually receives a pri-
vate signal xi = µ + "i, with "i » N(0; 1
¯), ¯ > 0. The noise parameters of the
private signals are assumed to be independent of each other, of the fundamental
state and of the noise parameter in the public signal: E("i"j) = 0 for i 6= j,
E("iµ) = 0 and E("º) = 0. The distributional properties of the noise parameter
in the private signal are again presumed to be common knowledge to all specu-
lators. However, as long as the precision ¯ of the private signals is ￿nite, private
signals might di￿er from each other and speculators cannot accurately establish
the signals of their opponents.
Thus, the information set I of speculator i in this model consists of two parts:
the common public signal and the individual private signal: Ii = (y;xi). Note,
that the public signal y enters every agent’s information set, so that y not only
provides information about the fundamental state of the economy but also about
what other agents observe. On the basis of their information sets, speculators
simultaneously have to decide whether to attack the currency or to stay with the
2This improper prior distribution with in￿nite mass presents no di￿culties as long as we are
concerned with conditional beliefs only. See also Hartigan (1983).
3For a more thorough discussion of this point see Morris/Shin (2000).
4Something is common knowledge, if everybody knows it, everybody knows that everybody
else knows it, and so on to in￿nity.
4peg. The central bank then observes the proportion l of attacking agents and
decides on maintaining the peg (if l < µ) or abandoning it (if l ¸ µ).
In order to derive the unique equilibrium, it is crucial to correctly de￿ne which
elements of the game are common knowledge. These are payo￿ D, cost t, the pub-
lic signal y and the distributional parameters of noise º and ", ® and ¯ respectively.
Whether the fundamental state µ is common knowledge as well, is endogenous to
the model, since µ becomes common knowledge if the public signal is in￿nitely
precise. Not only is then µ commonly known, but each speculator can infer his
opponents’ optimal equilibrium strategies, which invites multiple equilibria.
If the fundamental index µ becomes common knowledge, we get the typical
tripartition of fundamentals of a complete information game as in the original
multiple equilibria model by Obstfeld (1996):
² If µ > 1, the currency peg is stable, since the economy is sound enough so
that the central bank is always able to defend the peg.
² If µ · 0, the central bank always abandons the peg, irrespective of the
speculators’ actions and the currency peg is unstable.
² For 0 < µ · 1, the currency peg is said to be ripe for attack. In this interval,
if all speculators attack, the central bank will be forced to devalue, whereas
the peg will be kept if the speculators do not attack. However, since the
agents will only attack the currency if they believe in success and will refrain
from attacking otherwise, their actions vindicate the initial beliefs so that
expectations are self-ful￿lling for this range of fundamentals.
3 Incomplete Information - Unique Equilibrium
In the model of incomplete information we assume that ® and ¯ take on ￿nite
values, so that µ is prevented from becoming common knowledge.
In accordance with Morris and Shin (1999) we can state the following condition
for a unique equilibrium:
If the private signals are su￿ciently precise, i.e. for ¯ > ®2
2¼, there exists a unique
equilibrium consisting of a unique value of the fundamental index, µ¤, up to which
the central bank always abandons the peg, and a unique value of the private
signal, x¤, such that every speculator who receives a signal lower than x¤ attacks
the currency peg.
5The general intuition behind this proposition is the following: In the depicted
model, there is a unique fundamental value, denoted µ¤, which generates a distri-
bution of private signals, such that there is exactly one signal x¤, which makes a
speculator receiving this signal indi￿erent between attacking and not-attacking,
and which - if all speculators with signals smaller than x¤ decide to attack - gen-
erates a proportion of exactly l = µ¤ of attackers that is just su￿cient to force a
devaluation of the currency peg.
Before we turn to evaluating the in￿uence of the model parameters on the out-
come of the game between speculators and central bank, we derive the equilibrium
and show that it is indeed unique if the above condition is met.
3.1 Derivation of the Unique Equilibrium
The two equilibrium values µ¤ and x¤ belong to two situations of indi￿erence:
for µ = µ¤ the government is indi￿erent between defending the currency peg and
abandoning it, whereas speculators receiving a private signal of x¤ are indi￿erent
between attacking the peg and refraining from doing so5.
µ¤ and x¤ can be obtained as follows: Due to the assumption of normally
distributed noise parameters, the distribution of µ conditional on private and
public information is normal as well, so that the expected value of the unknown











As can be seen, the posterior expectation of µ is a weighted average of the informa-
tion the speculator possesses. The higher the precision of the public information,
®, the more important the public signal y gets, whereas the private signal gains
importance the higher the precision ¯ of this signal is.
However, since the public signal y is common knowledge for all speculators
and as such does not help to distinguish player i’s behaviour from player j’s, we
will in the following skip the public signal y as conditional argument whenever
possible and only use the private signal xi (resp. xj).
After receiving the private and public signal, each speculator has to decide
whether to attack the currency, which leads to costs of t and an uncertain payo￿
5For reasons of mathematical tractability we assume that after receiving the signal x¤, a
speculator decides to attack rather than not-attack.
6D, or not to sell the currency which is associated with a net pro￿t of zero with
certainty. Indi￿erence between these two possible actions is achieved if both lead
to the same expected net pro￿t:
0 = D ¢ Prob(attack successfuljx) ¡ t (3)
Since the central bank will abandon the peg for all fundamental indices smaller
than or equal to µ¤, the probability of a successful attack equals the probability
that µ is smaller than or equal to µ¤, given x. Thus, with Φ denoting the cumulated
normal density:
t = D ¢ Prob(µ · µ
¤jx)












The central bank is indi￿erent between defending the currency peg and aban-
doning it, if the proportion of speculators attacking the peg, l, equals µ. The
proportion of attacking speculators, however, is given by the proportion of specu-
lators who observe a private signal smaller than or equal to x¤. Since " is assumed
to be independent of the true value of µ, this proportion corresponds to the prob-
ability with which one single speculator observes a signal smaller than or equal to
x¤, given µ. l can thus be calculated as:
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From equations (??) and (??) we can thus derive the indi￿erence curve for the

























¡1(µ) + µ (8)
The equilibrium is then given as the intersection point of the two indi￿erence








Figure 1: Determination of the unique equilibrium




















while x¤ can be obtained from equation (??).
In the present model, (µ¤;x¤) forms a trigger-point equilibrium in the following
respect: A speculator observing a private signal x lower than the switching signal
x¤ chooses attack as optimal action, whereas after observing a private signal higher
than x¤ not attack is the optimal action. In the same way, the central bank’s
optimal action is to abandon the peg whenever the observed fundamental value µ
is lower than µ¤, but keep the peg is optimal if µ turns out to be higher than µ¤.
It is important to note, though, that the equilibrium values µ¤ and x¤ are
given by the exogenous parameters of the model which are common knowledge
to all players. Thus, the equilibrium can be determined before agents receive
their signals and before they take any actions. However, the choice of the true
fundamental state µ by nature determines whether there will be a crisis, by giving
the distribution of public and private signals that incite the speculators to run
on the currency peg or not to do so according to the above delineated decision
process.
3.2 Condition for Uniqueness
To show that the equilibrium is unique, we have to prove that there can be only
one value of the fundamental index and one value of the private signal which
8make both the central bank and the speculators indi￿erent, i.e. there is only one
intersection point of xSP(µ) and xCB(µ). This condition for a unique equilibrium
is satis￿ed if one of the indi￿erence curves runs steeper than the other throughout
the whole range of possible values. Since neither of the two indi￿erence functions
is limited to any range, the unique equilibrium then exists with certainty.














@µ¤ + 1 (11)
respectively.













For the following derivation of the uniqueness condition note that the smallest
value of
@Φ¡1(µ¤)
@µ¤ is equal to the reciprocal of the maximum value of the partial
derivative of Φ(µ¤) with respect to µ¤. This maximum value is given by the normal
density Á(µ¤) at its mean ¹ with Á(¹) = 1 p
2¼. Thus, the above su￿cient condition















Hence, for a given precision of the public signal, ®, the depicted equilibrium is
unique as long as the precision of the private signal, ¯, is high enough. If µ¤ is
unique, then x¤ must be unique as well.
Additionally to proving that there is only one equilibrium trigger strategy
around (µ¤;x¤), it can also be shown that this trigger strategy is the only strategy
which survives the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. For a complete
conduction of this proof we refer to Morris/Shin (1999)
6The two necessary conditions for the unique equilibrium to exist are D > t, and E("i"j) = 0.
94 Comparative Statics
In the following, we assume that uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed, i.e.
¯ > ®2
2¼, and examine the in￿uence which the di￿erent parameters exert on the
unique switching point (µ¤;x¤). De￿ne the probability of a currency crisis as
being proportional to the size of the interval [¡1;µ¤], since for values of µ in this
interval the ￿xed exchange rate will be devalued. Thus, the higher the switching
point µ¤ turns out to be, the higher is the danger of a currency crisis and vice
versa.7
From equation (??), which gives the equilibrium value of the fundamental
index, we can infer the following propositions:
Proposition 1 The probability of a currency crisis rises whenever t decreases
and/or D increases.
Proof:





















































1 ¡ Á(¢) ® p
¯
> 0
The partial derivative of µ¤ with respect to t (D) is always negative (positive), since
due to the condition of uniqueness the denominator stays positive and nonzero.
A rising t (D) thus decreases (increases) the switching value µ¤ and thereby the
probability of an exchange rate crisis. ¥
Increasing costs t reduce the expected net pro￿t of an attack for every prob-
ability of success. Consequently, controlling for the costs of international capital
transactions might be a possibility to prevent speculative attacks on currency
pegs. This result obviously favours the introduction of a tax on international
capital transactions in order to avoid currency crises.
7Note, that due to the assumed improper prior distribution this de￿nition of probability is,
strictly taken, ￿awed. However, working with a more realistic prior distribution should lead to
similar results. As such, it is justi￿ed to work with the simpler concept of an improper prior
distribution and at least approximate the true probability of a currency crisis with the above
de￿nition.




















1 ¡ Á(¢) ® p
¯
< 0
The higher the public signal, the lower the switching point µ¤ turns out to be,
and thus the narrower gets the range of fundamentals for which an attack would
be successful and vice versa. ¥
Thus, the higher the public signal about the fundamental state of the economy,
the lower is the probability of a crisis. Since the public signal y is symmetrically
distributed around the realized fundamental index µ, E(yjµ) = µ, we can moreover
state that y tends to be high if the realized fundamental index µ is high and vice
versa. As such, the fundamental index µ has an - albeit indirect - negative e￿ect
on µ¤, which is the stronger the higher ®, i.e. the more precise the public signal
is. This is a desirable feature of our model which is not contained in the models of
multiple equilibria. Whereas under common knowledge of µ the switch in beliefs
about the outcome of the game does not depend on the fundamentals, there is a
dependence in the model of incomplete knowledge through the public signal.
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exerts a negative in￿uence on the probability of a currency crisis.
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1 ¡ Á(¢) ® p
¯
In the unique equilibrium, @µ¤






so that the numerator becomes negative, whereas @µ¤













precision of the private signals decreases the probability of a currency crisis. In
contrast, if µ¤ falls short of the threshold, a higher precision of the private signals





increases in y, whereas µ¤ decreases in y according to proposition 2, there must
be a value of y, denoted as y¯, such that µ¤ is exactly equal to the threshold:8





. It is easy to see that for all public signals lower than
y¯, a higher precision of the private signals is a￿liated with a lower probability of
a crisis, whereas for all public signals higher than y¯ more precise private signals
lead to a higher probability of a currency crisis. Since the public signal tends to
be high if the realized fundamental index µ is high and vice versa, it follows that
increasing the precision of the private signals in￿uences the probability of a crisis
negatively in case of bad fundamentals and has a positive in￿uence in case of good
fundamentals.
For interpreting the in￿uence of ¯ on the probability of a currency crisis,
note that a speculator deciding on his optimal action has to take two aspects
into account: on the one hand, he wants to choose an action that is appropriate
to the realized but unknown fundamental state. On the other hand, he knows
that for the relevant intermediate range of fundamentals it is possible to force a
devaluation of the currency peg through sheer speculative pressure. As such, he
wants to coordinate his own decision on his opponents’ actions, so that even for
good fundamentals a devaluation might be achieved.
Whereas both signals give information about the fundamental state of the
economy, only the private signals have a direct e￿ect on the coordination incentive
described above. Speculators decide on their optimal action solely based on their
speci￿c information set. Equivalent information sets lead to the same actions.
What makes speculator i’s information set di￿erent from speculator j’s is only
the private part, since private signals might di￿er from each other. The more
precise the private signals are, however, the more closely they will be distributed
around the truly realized fundamental state µ and the more similar the information
sets will be. This amounts to saying that varying the precision of the private
signals foremost a￿ects the coordination incentive: the higher ¯ the easier it is
to coordinate on a certain action. However, both private and public signal exert
an indirect e￿ect on the coordination incentive. The more precise one type of
signal is, the higher is the respective weight that is attached to this signal in
calculating the expected value of the unknown fundamental index µ. Since the
8y¯ exists with certainty, since the public signal y is not restricted to any range of values.
12weighing scheme of the signals is common knowledge, this indirect coordination
e￿ect is not negligible but quite important.
The interpretation of the e￿ects of an increasing precision ¯ is then quite
intuitive. The more precise the private signals, the less weight will be given to the
informational content of the public signal. Take the case of good fundamentals,
where the public signal is high. With an intermediate precision of the private
signals, speculators tend to refrain from attacking since they know that for good
fundamentals a large proportion of agents has to coordinate on the attack-action
in order to force a devaluation. If, in contrast, the precision of private signals is
extremely high, speculators will simply neglect the content of the public signal,
which tells them that the fundamental state of the economy is good. Consequently,
they will become more aggressive in attacking the peg compared to a situation with
less precise private signals, so that the probability of a currency crisis increases.
In case of bad fundamentals, the reverse holds. Here, the public signal will be
low, so that speculators should want to attack, since a devaluation can easily
be achieved. If, however, the private signals are extremely precise, speculators
neglect the informational content of the public signal and refrain from attacking,
which leads to a lower crisis probability in case of bad fundamentals.
Proposition 4 The precision of the public signal ® exerts a positive in￿uence on
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1 ¡ Á(¢) ® p
¯
In the unique equilibrium, the partial derivative of µ¤ with respect to the precision







, whereas it is negative








Thus, if the equilibrium switching value of µ¤ is high enough to exceed the




D), increasing the precision of the public signal raises
13the probability of a currency crisis. If, however, µ¤ falls short of the threshold,
increasing ® decreases the likelihood of a crisis. Again, the threshold-function
increases in the value of the public signal y, whereas µ¤ decreases in y, so that there





for public signals lower than y®, a higher precision ® of the public signal leads
to a higher probability of a currency crisis. If, however, y is higher than y®, an
increased precision of public information leads to a lower crisis probability. Since
the value of the public signal tends to be high if the realized fundamental state is
good and vice versa, we ￿nd that a higher precision of public information leads to
a higher danger of a crisis if the fundamentals of the economy are bad, whereas
the probability of a crisis will be lower with very precise public information if this
information is about good fundamentals.
These e￿ects are again quite intuitive. In contrast to the private signal, the
public signal only gives information about the fundamental state of the economy
and is included in each speculator’s information set. Since it cannot be used
to di￿erentiate between individual private signals, the public signal has no di-
rect in￿uence on possible coordination e￿ects. Consequently, if the public signal
is known to be very precise and if it indicates a bad fundamental state of the
economy, this clearly tells speculators to attack the currency peg for two reasons:
￿rst, each speculator knows that in case of bad fundamentals the proportion of
attacking agents necessary to force a devaluation is not very high, which increases
the probability of a successful attack. Second, if the public signal is very precise,
each agent knows that all other agents will put more weight on the public signal
in calculating the expected value of µ, so that there is an indirect coordination
e￿ect. For good fundamentals, exactly the opposite e￿ects occur.
The results of propositions 3 and 4 are summed up in the following ￿gure:9
9It has been assumed here that 1
2D < t < D so that y¯ > y®. If, instead, 0 < t < 1
2D
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Figure 2: In￿uence of ® and ¯
What can be seen from the discussion of comparative statics in this section
is that better information, in the sense of more precise information, does not al-
ways lead to a lower probability of a currency crisis, as has been suggested by
former models. Moreover, the mechanisms of a changing informativeness are very
complex. The most important result, however, is that with the given structure of
private and public signals, the fundamental state of the economy plays an impor-
tant role in determining the in￿uence of the signals’ precision on the probability
of a currency crisis. If the fundamental state of the economy is good, a higher
precision of the public signal leads to a lower probability of a crisis, whereas very
precise private signals tend to increase the likelihood of a crisis. For bad funda-
mentals, the in￿uence of the signals’ precision is exactly the reverse. As can be
seen from the above ￿gure, there is only a small range of public signals (and as
such of fundamental values), where both signals exert the same in￿uence on the
probability of a crisis. However, this interval for y, respectively µ, vanishes with
increasing ® and/or ¯.10
5 Unique and Multiple Equilibria and the Impor-
tance of Private and Public Information
Since we know that a unique equilibrium can only be sustained for rather precise
private signals relative to the public signal, a declining ¯, respectively a rising ®,
will eventually lead to multiple equilibria. This can easily be seen from the ￿gure





decreases in ®, ¯ and D, but increases in t.










Figure 3: Regions of unique and multiple equilibria
If ¯ declines, while ® stays constant, speculators are not able to precisely
establish the information received by the other agents, so that they are not able
to coordinate on a speci￿c action for a given µ. Since they cannot be sure that
the necessary amount of coordination, i.e., the proportion of attacking agents,
will be achieved, the optimal action for them at some point is again to attack if
everyone else attacks and to refrain from short-selling if that is what they expect
everyone else to do. With ¯ going to zero, the private part in the information sets
will simply be neglected, so that information sets are the same for all speculators
which invites multiple equilibria. However, if the precision of public information
® increases for a given ¯, the informational content of the private signal falls more
and more behind so that it is eventually neglected and again, multiple equilibria
arise.
Hence, in case of a bad fundamental state of the economy, both a very precise
public signal and a very imprecise public signal, i.e. high as well as low ®, can
lead to an outcome of the game with not-attack being the chosen strategy: On
the one hand, if ® is su￿ciently low relative to ¯ so that a unique equilibrium is
guaranteed, bad fundamentals lead to µ¤ exceeding the above given threshold so
that a low (lowering) ® brings about a small (decreasing) probability of a currency
crisis. On the other hand, if the public information’s precision is extraordinarily
high, so that the condition for uniqueness is violated, there is at least a certain,
11Note, however, that due to the depicted condition only being su￿cient but not necessary
for uniqueness, there might be a unique equilibrium above the line ® =
p
2¼¯ as well. Yet,
generally, we will refer to the upper area as the multiple equilibria region.
16however not calculable, probability that in the revived multiplicity of equilibria
speculators will coordinate on the no-attack equilibrium, since this coordination
will no longer depend on the fundamental state of the economy. However, it
obviously stands to reason if an increased uncertainty of the realized equilibrium
will ever be preferred, even with very bad fundamentals.
6 Conclusion
From the delineated model we are able to see that the introduction of noise to the
information gathering process of speculators brings a further crucial condition (of
a net expected pro￿t equal to zero) into the model. Consequently, all equilibria
but one are eliminated, if the precision of private information is high enough
relative to the precision of public information.
In contrast to the earlier multiple equilibria models of currency crises we are
now able to give directions for policy devices. First, the increase of transac-
tion costs certainly reduces speculators’ incentives to intervene on international
￿nancial markets and therefore reduces the probability of a speculative currency
attack. Second, the better (i.e. the higher) the public signal about the funda-
mental state of the economy, the lower is the danger of a crisis. Third, the sheer
increase in the amount of information in the market, i.e. increasing the precision
of information, is obviously not enough to prevent currency crises. In particular,
if the fundamental state of the economy is bad, disseminating very precise public
information is crucial as it increases the probability of a currency crisis further,
whereas a high precision of private signals will decrease it. In contrast, in case of
good fundamentals, the precision of public information decreases the probability
of a currency crisis, while the precision of private information raises it.
However, there is still a number of open questions. Sbracia and Zaghini (2001)
for instance analyse further conditions for unique and multiple equilibria in a
slightly di￿erent setting. Hellwig (2000) investigates into information structures
in more detail and connects the resulting equilibrium with higher-order uncer-
tainty. Morris and Shin (2001) are concerned with welfare e￿ects of public infor-
mation in models with strategic complementarities. Similarly, Chui/Gai/Haldane
(2000) analyse the implications of sovereign liquidity crises for public policy. An-
other interesting aspect is to depart from simultaneous move games, in which
speculators have to decide on their strategies at the same point in time, and
to look at sequential move games. In these models, agents not only get a pri-
vate signal but they can also observe the actions that earlier speculators decided
17on. As an example of such a model see for instance Dasgupta (2000). An again
di￿erent aspect in current research is to allow for speculators of di￿erent sizes
(Corsetti/Dasgupta/Morris/Shin (2000)).
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